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In response to the need to leverage private finance and the lack of competition in 
some parts of the Australian public sector infrastructure market, especially in the very 
large economic infrastructure sector procured using Pubic Private Partnerships, the 
Australian Federal government has demonstrated its desire to attract new sources of 
in-bound foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper aims to report on progress 
towards an investigation into the determinants of multinational contractors’ 
willingness to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure projects. This 
research deploys Dunning’s eclectic theory for the first time in terms of in-bound FDI 
by multinational contractors into Australia. Elsewhere, the authors have developed 
Dunning’s principal hypothesis to suit the context of this research and to address a 
weakness arising in this hypothesis that is based on a nominal approach to the factors 
in Dunning's eclectic framework and which fails to speak to the relative explanatory 
power of these factors. In this paper, a first stage test of the authors' development of 
Dunning's hypothesis is presented by way of an initial review of secondary data vis-à-
vis the selected sector (roads and bridges) in Australia (as the host location) and with 
respect to four selected home countries (China; Japan; Spain; and US). In doing so, 
the next stage in the research method concerning sampling and case studies is also 
further developed and described in this paper. In conclusion, the extent to which the 
initial review of secondary data suggests the relative importance of the factors in the 
eclectic framework is considered. It is noted that more robust conclusions are 
expected following the future planned stages of the research including primary data 
from the case studies and a global survey of the world’s largest contractors and which 
is briefly previewed. Finally, and beyond theoretical contributions expected from the 
overall approach taken to developing and testing Dunning’s framework, other 
expected contributions concerning research method and practical implications are 
mentioned.  
Keywords: Dunning's eclectic paradigm, multinational contracting, secondary data, 
research method. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Runeson and de Valence (2008) observed 
the emergence of a two-tiered construction market comprising the more traditional 
local/national market and a new global construction industry based on high 
technology and a business strategy revolving more around value for money 
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throughout the project's life cycle and fuelled to a significant extent by procurement 
modes like Public-Private partnerships (PPP). Runeson and de Valence (2008) 
consider that this market is limited in terms of competition and it seems reasonable to 
suspect that this market may have become even less competitive, perhaps towards a 
duopoly in some sectors and locations - amidst and in the wake of the GFC. Indeed 
and in Australia for example, there is an example of a major toll road project in 2009 
that was switched from a proposed PPP to a more traditional funded project due to a 
lack of expressions of interest from PPP consortia. The Federal Australian government 
has noted its desire to see new foreign construction entrants into the Australian public 
sector major infrastructure market (Infrastructure Australia 2011). And in pursuance 
of this, is developing a number of initiatives including trade-delegation style meetings 
and reforms to PPP procurement practice to reduce bid costs (Hepworth 2010 and 
Cameron 2008). Based on this background, an investigation into the determinants of 
multinational contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure 
projects appears important from both the perspectives of government and 
multinational contractors. 
In pursuance of explaining the determinants of multinational contractors’ willingness 
to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure projects, the authors (Rahman, Bridge 
and Rowlinson 2010; Rahman et al. 2011a; Rahman et al. 2011b) summarize the 
relevance of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of internationalisation. In doing so, the 
authors more clearly articulate Dunning’s principal hypothesis and generalised 
predications within the context of multinational contracting to reflect a lack of in-
bound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (reverse of Dunning’s original stated 
hypothesis and predications), as follows: 
 Condition 1: The extent to which it (the multinational contractor outside 
Australia) possesses unique and sustainable ownership (O) advantages vis-à-
vis other multinational contractors outside and domiciled in Australia, in 
servicing the Australian market… 
 Condition 2: Assuming that condition (1) is satisfied, the extent to which the 
multinational contractor outside Australia perceive it to be in their best interest 
to add value to their O advantages than to sell them, or their right of use, to 
independent foreign firms (these advantages are called market internalisation 
or I advantages)... 
 Condition 3: Assuming that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the extent to 
which the global interest of the multinational contractor outside Australia is 
served by creating, accessing or utilizing, their O advantages in Australia 
(Location or L advantages)… 
 Condition 4: Given the configuration of the OLI advantages facing a 
multinational contractor outside Australia, the extent to which this 
multinational contractor believes that foreign production in Australia is 
consistent with the long-term objectives of its stakeholders and instructions 
underpinning its managerial and organizational strategic. 
 In terms of the corresponding generalised predictions, again these are given in 
reverse terms to reflect a lack of in-bound FDI into Australia follows: the more 
Australian-based multinational contractors relative to other multinational 
contractors possess desirable O advantages, the lesser the incentive other 
multinational contractors have to internalize rather than externalize their use (I 
disadvantages), the less other multinational contractors find it in their interest 
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to access or exploit them in Australia (L disadvantages), then the less Australia 
is likely to attract in-bound investment by multinational contractors.  
 
Furthermore, the authors (Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson 2010; Rahman et al. 2011a; 
Rahman et al. 2011b) proceed to justify discounting the I factor (Condition 2) given 
the nature of the dependent variable in this research. That is, Dunning (2002) relies on 
orthodox internalisation theory to explain internalisation associated with FDI and 
which pertains to vertical integration and the firm's entry mode decision. In contrast, 
the basis of the nature of the dependent variable in this research is upstream of the 
entry mode decision and concerns horizontal integration. Such that, the issue is not so 
much if internalisation occurs but how much internalisation occurs. More specifically, 
in this research, the multinational contractor bids as lead or head contractor for new 
public sector infrastructure projects and given the immobile nature of construction, 
needs to have on-the-spot interactions with the client, co-consortium members and 
subcontractors and suppliers. As such, the authors (Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson 
2010; Rahman et al. 2011a; Rahman et al. 2011b) focus on the O and L factors 
(Conditions 1 and 3 respectively) in order develop three propositions designed to 
address a weakness arising in Dunning’s principal hypothesis. That is, although both 
these factors may be necessary conditions to explain FDI, logically, there may be 
cases in which both factors may not need to be present to the same degree to explain 
FDI. Table 1 illustrates this at the margins (Cases 2 and 3) in terms of the effects of O 
and L factors on FDI. 
Table 1: Effects of the O and L factors at the margins (MNC = Multinational Contractor) 
Case O factor L factor FDI (Level of 
attractiveness) 
    
MNC 1 Advantages Advantages Yes/(Highest) 
MNC 2 Advantages Marginal Advantage ? 
MNC 3 Marginal Advantage Advantages ? 
MNC 4 Disadvantages Disadvantages No (Lowest) 
 
As it currently stands, Dunning’s hypothesis and “generalised” predications are stated 
in broad terms and most directly targets Case 1 and Case 4 in Table 1. Thus, relying 
on Dunning’s hypothesis, it’s not possible to be specific in terms of predicting which 
multinational contractors in Cases 2 or 3 will undertake FDI/be more or less attracted 
to a market and which fall between the upper level of FDI/highly attractive market 
depicted by Case 1 multinational contractor and the lower level of FDI/least attractive 
market that is Case 4 multinational contractor. The notion that the O and L factors can 
display different levels of explanatory power can be expected to be seen most clearly 
in the extreme circumstances in which multinational contractors have similar O 
attributes or multinational contractors are from the same location such that the L and 
O factors would be expected to dominate respectively. 
In brief, whilst there is evidence in the context of multinational contracting that 
demonstrates the significance of the O and L factors on the FDI decision (including 
Cuervo and Pheng 2003a and b), logic suggests that there are cases in which either of 
these factors plays a substantially more important role in explaining FDI. And given 
an absence of research that reveals the relative importance of these factors with 
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respect to a specific industry sector in a particular host country, then this provides a 
significant research opportunity to refine and develop Dunning’s hypothesis to more 
clearly address differential explanatory power across the O and L factors and to more 
fully account for a wider range of cases.  
In order to explore the relative explanatory power of the O and L factors and extend 
Dunning’s hypothesis, the authors (Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson 2010; Rahman et 
al. 2011a; Rahman et al. 2011b) develop a number of propositions. The first two 
propositions concern exploring the extreme cases, first, in which multinational 
contractors have similar O attributes and, second, multinational contractors are from 
the same location. Together these propositions seek to establish the position that either 
the O or L factor may essentially be doing the substantive explanatory work. 
Consistent with this, the third proposition concerns the more generalised notion of 
differential explanatory power across the O and L factors towards addressing cases at 
the margin.  
Table 2 uses a facial symbol to reflect similarities/differences in O attributes and 
illustrates the outcomes from the first two propositions. That is, by adopting extreme 
positions and observing differences in the range of the reported level of overall 
attractiveness in the focal market down the four columns of multinational contractors 
with dissimilar O attributes in the same home country/location (Proposition 1) and in 
contrast to the range of the reported level of overall attractiveness in the focal market 
across each of the three rows/groups of multinational contractors with similar O 
attributes but in different home countries/locations (Proposition 2), evidence is 
generated to indicate the relative importance of O and L factors vis-à-vis a particular 
sector and in the host market (and in this research - road and bridges in Australia). 
Such that, if a greater range in the reported level of overall attractiveness in the focal 
market is observed down the columns than across the rows, then this indicates that the 
O factor is more important and has more explanatory power than the L factor vis-à-vis 
the sector concerned in the host market and vice versa. In terms of helping to reveal 
the relative importance of O and L factors, it is expected that the relative strength of 
the correlation/level of statistical significance of the O and/or L factors/dimensions 
generated from a final Proposition 3 will be consistent with the outcomes from 
Propositions 1 and 2, again vis-à-vis the sector concerned in the host market. 
In summary, Dunning’s hypothesis is developed across three propositions in 
pursuance of developing and refining the explanatory power of the O and L factors 
(Dunning’s conditions 1 and 3) - contingent on the firm’s motivation (Dunning’s 
condition 4) and having discounted the I factor (Dunning’s condition 2). The research 
method is designed to collect data to test the three propositions and has been outlined 
by the authors (Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson 2010; Rahman et al. 2011 a; Rahman 
et al. 2011b). The research plan comprises three stages (secondary data; case studies; 
and survey) in each of four home countries, namely China; Japan; Spain; and US vis-
à-vis the infrastructure sector selected (roads and bridges over AUD50 million) in 
Australia - as the host market. Each stage seeks to surface corroborating evidence 
concerning ownership advantages; location advantages; and business motivation to 
test the propositions. 
Testing Dunning's framework 
 
Table 2: Propositions 1 and 2 
Roads and Bridges in Australia 
(AUD>50million) 
Home country 
China 
Home 
country 
Japan 
Home country 
Spain 
Home country 
US 
Operating/expressing an 
interest in Australia  
Group 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Operating/expressing an 
interest in Australia  
Group 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Operating/expressing an 
interest in Australia  
Group 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
  = O advantages in comparison to contractors of other nationalities/local 
contractors in serving the Australian market  
  = O advantages and disadvantages in comparison to contractors of other 
nationalities/local contractors in serving the Australian market  
  = O disadvantages in comparison to contractors of other nationalities/local 
contractors in serving the Australian market 
 
The aim of this paper is present a first stage test of the authors' development of 
Dunning's hypothesis by way of an initial review of secondary data vis-à-vis the 
selected sector (roads and bridges) in Australia (as the host location) and with respect 
to four selected home countries (China; Japan; Spain; and US). In doing so, the next 
stage in the research method concerning sampling and the ownership advantages 
component in the case studies is also further developed and described in this paper.  
SAMPLING 
From population to sampling frame 
Of the population/all the multinational contractors in the world, Engineering News 
Record’s (ENR) top 225 contractors is used as the basis of creating the sampling 
frame. That is, there are 155 multinational contractors noted in the ENR (2010) list in 
terms of operating in the transport sector. Upon checking the homepage for all of the 
225 contractors,163 of these contractors advise that they operate in roads and bridges. 
Some of the 155 contractors in the ENR list do not appear in the 163 contractors 
identified from the website search and some of the contractors from this website 
search do not appear in 155 contractors listed the transport sector in ENR and so 
accounting for this, the eventual sampling frame may be up to 188 contractors. These 
188 contractors will then be invited to participate in the stage 3 survey used to 
generalise findings beyond the secondary data and case studies findings. 
Non-probability sampling 
With regard to the stage 1 secondary data review presented in this paper and the next 
stage 2 case studies, this section  summarises a non-probability, or purposive, 
approach to identifying the case studies and which deploys the logic in Table 2. In 
order to allow the effect of variations in location advantages on the overall 
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attractiveness of the Australian market to be most effectively observed (looking across 
the rows in the Table 2), two of the home countries are selected from Australia’s 
region (China and Japan), whilst the other two home countries are from outside 
Australia’s region (Spain and US). The pair of countries within Australia’s region and 
the pair of countries outside of Australia’s region are selected as having contrasting 
construction industries and which are likely to create greater home-host induced 
differences arising from cultural; administrative; geographic and economic 
distances/differences. These differences generate investment and set-up costs/risks 
and which is one of the two dimensions in the L factor. The other L factor concerns 
perceptions of return (once the multinational contractor is at full operating 
effectiveness/efficiency and beyond the set-up costs) available in the sector in 
Australia and which all contractors face - in terms of pipeline and the extant market 
structure/level of competiveness in the sector but which is then perceived differently 
by contractors from different home locations due to the relative returns/size in their 
home and other host markets available to these contractors from different home 
locations. 
In order to create the greatest opportunity to observe deviations in ownership 
advantages (denoted by the facial symbol) and to assess the effect of variations in 
ownership advantages on the overall attractiveness of the Australian market (looking 
down the columns in Table 2), three groups of contractors will be sought. All 
contractors case studied will remain anonymous. 
The four contractors in Group 1 (one from each home location) are selected on the 
basis of having the highest levels of overseas revenue in roads and bridges and the 
highest level of connection to Australia - in terms of the following six bands: 
 Band 1: Majority ownership of a contractor (subsidiary) in the NPS; 
 Band 2: Less than 50 percent current ownership of a contractor in the NPS; 
 Band 3: Expressing an interest in Australia in last 12 months; 
 Band 4: Majority ownership of a contractor (subsidiary) domiciled in Australia 
in last five years; 
 Band 5: Less than 50 percent ownership of a contractor domiciled in Australia 
in last five years;  
 Band 6: Expressed an interest in Australia in last 5 years. 
 
In contrast, Groups 2 and 3 comprise the most successful (amongst the top half) and 
least successful (amongst the bottom half) of multinational contractors again with 
reference to overseas revenue in the sector in each of the four home locations but not 
operating in Australia (middle and bottom rows in Table 2). These multinational 
contractors in Groups 2 and 3 not operating in Australia are defined as contractors 
from the four home locations not in any of the Bands 1-6. 
OWNERSHIP ADVANTAGES (CASE STUDY DESIGN) 
As noted in the key to Table 2, the facial symbols are relative to other contractors 
serving the Australian market. The contractors may or may not be wholly located in 
Australia. In order to create a reference point for comparison purposes, six contractors 
from Australia's National Prequalification System (NPS) for Civil Construction, Road 
and Bridge are selected and assessed in terms of their ownership advantages.  More 
specifically, two of Australia’s leading NPS contractors (in terms of market share in 
the sector) in the highest financial level (AUD 150million plus) in the NPS will be 
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selected along with two other contractors in the bottom half of this financial level, 
again in terms of market share. Two further NPS contractors will be selected in the 
financial level (AUD 100 million). Contractors in this level are assessed as capable of 
undertaking a maximum value of $100million and which approximately corresponds 
to the other extreme in terms of the value parameter in the sector selected and which is 
road and bridges greater than AUD 50million.  
In the context of this research, an ownership/O advantage is a resource/attribute that 
gives a multinational contractor a competitive advantage and promotes the 
multinational contractor in terms of successfully bidding for a new project and is a 
resource that is not possessed by all competitors in the sector comprising roads and 
bridges over $50million in Australia. As part of the review of secondary data, 
including the NPS criteria and a review of all the websites from the 32 contractors in 
the NPS financial levels AUD100million to AUD 150 million plus was undertaken 
along with a review of all the websites of contractors in the home countries falling in 
Bands 1 to 6. This review focused on identifying keywords/phrases pertaining to the 
strengths of the contractors and as an initial indication of firm specific O advantages. 
The range of these advantages or attributes is shown in Figure 1 and which is an 
indicative sketch, for illustrative purposes, of a radar map for two NPS contractors in 
the financial level AUD 150million plus.  
To create an accurate reference radar map reflecting the six NPS contractors and by 
which to compare Group 1, 2 and 3 contractors from home countries, an objective set 
of measures will be developed relating the scope of attributes shown in Figure 1. On 
each attribute and on the basis of scores recorded from the two leading NPS 
contractors in the highest NPS financial level AUD150 million plus (termed upper 
Tier 1 contractors from this point); the two contractors in the bottom half of the 
highest NPS financial level AUD150 million plus (termed lower Tier 1 contractors 
from this point); and the two contractors in the NPS financial level AUD 100million 
(termed Tier 2 contractors from this point) the three pairs of contractors will be ranked 
and a score of 7 awarded to the pair of best scoring contractors, a score of 1 awarded 
to the worst scoring pair of contractors and a score of 4 awarded to the mid-placed 
pair of contractors. Having obtained objective measurements of the highest point 7; 
the mid-point 4 and lowest point 1 on each attribute, then the remaining points 2 to 3 
and 5 to 6 will be interpolated. Such that, an entire 7-point scale will be 
operationalised for each attribute, for comparative proposes. Finally, a consolidated 
radar map will be created for the 3 pairs of NPS contractors. That is, a map showing 
three NPS lines: an Upper Tier 1 line; a lower Tier 1 line; and a Tier 2 line will be 
developed. Group 1, 2 and 3 contractors in each of the four home locations will then 
be assessed using the same objective measures for each attribute and their results 
mapped relative to the three NPS lines. In all cases, only the lines will be published, 
with the responses to objective measures on each attribute remaining confidential. 
Once the radar map for each of the home country contractors in each of the three 
groups is established, the symbol  is given to a home contractor whose radar map 
falls mostly above the lower Tier 1 map and the symbol  is assigned to a home 
contractor whose radar map falls mostly between the lower Tier 1 map and the Tier 2 
map. The symbol  is given to a home contractor who scores below Point-1 on any 
attribute pertaining to the NPS criteria. This contractor is effectively being assessed as 
unlikely to achieve prequalification and win any road and bridge project greater than 
$50 million in Australia. The approach taken to selecting the three groups of 
contractors from each of the four home countries, described above, is designed to aim 
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to create the pattern of facial symbols shown in Tables 2 and, in doing so, facilitate the 
testing of the propositions.  
Having reviewed the secondary data pertaining to O advantages and which comprise 
mainly contractors’ websites and including company reports and financial statements, 
it’s clear that this source of data is, on its own, insufficient to develop clear reference 
and comparative maps of NPS contractors’ and home contractors’ O advantages. At 
the same time, a survey approach is also unlikely to surface this rich information. 
Hence, the creation of the radar maps will rely heavily on the planned case studies. 
The case studies will also generate perceptual data concerning L advantages, business 
motivation and the dependent variable concerning the overall attractiveness of the 
sector in Australia. That said, the review of secondary data has played an essential role 
in the further design and approach to be taken in the cases described in this paper. The 
review of secondary data will also be extended to include consideration of the broader 
environment surrounding the road and bridges sector in each of the four home 
countries, or the home related O advantages and which will corroborate and give a 
background explanation to the profile of the radar maps for the home country 
contractors relative to the reference NPS contractors’ radar maps. Here, Porter’s 
(1990) diamond model will be used and in doing so, factor conditions; demand 
conditions; related and supporting industries; and strategy, structure and rivalry will 
be considered and which have at least relevance to the road and bridges sector in each 
of the four home locations. In brief, Porter’s model will help explain the scores to be 
observed on each attribute in terms of the home related factors that are able to be 
accessed and mobilised by the home contractor and potentially expressed as a more 
competitive/desirable bid (across cost and/or benefits perceived to be important by the 
client).  
Moreover, the review of secondary data has also at least started to talk to the relative 
importance of O versus L factors. In so far as, there are number of contractors from 
the home countries (for example, Acciona from Spain and Fluor from US), that have 
subsidiaries in the sector in Australia but which are not amongst the leading few 
contractors in their home country (ENR 2010). This suggests that there are other 
contractors from these home countries that are capable of winning road and bridge 
projects in Australia and that factors other than O advantages, could be more 
important. Finally, the strength of the contribution of secondary data, relative to 
primary data from the planned case studies and survey, will be indicated more clearly 
in the next section concerning L advantages. 
 
Testing Dunning's framework 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of ownership advantages 
LOCATION ADVANTAGES  
Secondary data in relation to the roads and bridges sector is generated to help assess 
the two dimensions associated with L advantages and which concern return and risk. 
With respect to the return envisaged by the L factor, this concerns perceptions of 
normal profit/expected industry returns in the host market, given the level of extant 
competition and excluding set-up costs, and these perceptions of host market return 
are affected and relative to returns available in the home market and other competing 
host markets. To surface background factors that indicate the level of competition and 
the level of potential profit and which can corroborate the perceptions of the host 
market returns (to be generated in the case studies), Porter’s (1985) five forces model 
analysis is used. This model focuses on internal rivalry; entry; substitutes and 
complements; supplier power; and buyer power. Deploying this model in roads and 
bridges over AUD 50 million in Australia surfaces three distinct further sectors/sub-
sectors comprising: road and bridges between AUD 50 million and AUD 800 million; 
road and bridges over AUD 800 million; and roads and bridges procured using PPPs. 
These three sub-sectors will be used as a background and having identified the key 
sub-sector (preferred project value range and procurement) within road and bridges 
for the home country contractor (in the case study setting) and as a means of more 
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accurately understanding their perceptions of the return component in the L factor. To 
complete the picture concerning the perception of returns from a home contractor, 
secondary data will again be used in deploying Porter's model but this time in terms of 
the sub-sector selected in the home country and in the key overseas locations (other 
than Australia) for the home country contractor. Such that, the overall perceptions of 
return in the selected sub-sector for the home contractor but in Australia can be 
explained and corroborated as a function of the outcomes of a five forces analysis of 
the selected sub-sector in the host country relative to home country; and key overseas 
locations for the home contractor. As a further and more fundamental check of the 
overall perceptions of return in the selected sub-sector in Australia, the size of demand 
in these various locations is also generated via secondary data. 
In terms of the risk dimension envisaged by the L factor, this relates to country 
specific investment set-up costs/risks and arise out of home-host induced 
distances/differences. Rugman and Verbke (2005) explain that Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) logic and variables (asset specificity; uncertainly; and frequency) 
can be used to reflect the influence of country specific investments. Here, asset 
specificity can be measured using secondary data in terms of the cultural; 
administrative; geographic; and economic (CAGE) differences created between each 
of the home locations and the host location/Australia and are summarised (as ranked 
differences) in Table 3. That is, Hofstede's (2001) model is used to reflect the cultural 
distance between Australia and each of the four home locations and computed as 
follows: China at 4.66; Japan at 2.72; Spain at 1.62; and US at 0.02. Hence, China is 
ranked 4 (greatest distance/difference relative to Australia) and US ranked 1 (least 
distance/difference relative to Australia). Business Monitor International (BMI, 2011) 
is used to assess administrative risk between Australia and the four home countries in 
this research and with particular respect to legal/regulatory risks and political risk. 
With regard to geographic distances, account is made of the relative communications 
technology between Australia and the four countries in mitigating issues and costs 
associated with physical distance. On the economic differences, again BMI (2011) 
scores concerning economic/financial risk are used, along with Euromoney country 
risk (ECR, 2011) report and other macroeconomic indicators including GDP. In order 
to pick-up TCE’s uncertainty dimension towards capturing country specific 
investment, once again BMI (2011) is used and this time the Business Environment 
Rating scores. Finally, with regard to TCE’s frequency dimension, assessment is made 
of the relative difference between the nature and size of the roads and bridges sector in 
each of the home countries versus Australia and including differences in total revenue; 
average size of project; and popular approaches to procuring projects in the sector. 
This assessment of the TCE’s frequency dimension is relevant in terms of affecting 
perceptions amongst contractors of the scope to recover and justify country specific 
investments. 
Table 3: Country specific investments (risk) relative to Australia 
Home 
Country 
Culture Admin Geographic Economic Uncertainty Frequency 
China 4 4 2 3 4 3 
Japan 3 2 1 2 2 1 
Spain 2 3 3 1 3 1 
US 1 1 4 4 1 4 
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China and US account for all of the “4s” in Table 3 and which suggests contractors 
from these countries may face higher country specific investments (risks) in setting-up 
operations/take a much dimmer view of these set-up costs/risks than contractors from 
Japan or Spain. This analysis of secondary data pertaining to the risk dimension in the 
L advantages factor seems to be highly relevant given the much lower incidence of 
Chinese and US contractors in the Australian roads and bridges market and especially 
as China and US account for largest number of contractors in the 188 contractors that 
make-up the previously described sample frame in this study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reported on progress towards an investigation into the determinants of 
multinational contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector major 
infrastructure projects and which is designed to give an improved understanding of 
matters surrounding FDI into Australian roads and bridges over AUD 50million. More 
specifically, this paper has presented a first stage test of the authors' development of 
Dunning's hypothesis by way of an initial review of secondary data vis-à-vis the 
selected sector (roads and bridges) in Australia (as the host location) and with respect 
to four selected home countries (China; Japan; Spain; and US). In doing so, the next 
stage in the research method concerning sampling and the ownership advantages 
component in the case studies has also been further developed and described in this 
paper, and beyond that outlined elsewhere by the authors (Rahman, Bridge and 
Rowlinson 2010; Rahman et al. 2011a; Rahman et al. 2011b).  
In terms of the contribution of this initial review of secondary data and towards 
speaking to the relative importance of O advantages versus L advantages in explaining 
the current extent of FDI/expressions of interest in Australia from contractors in the 
four home countries, some very tentative conclusions can be drawn at this stage. That 
is, this secondary data seems to suggest, that L advantages may have more 
explanatory power than O Advantages. This is on the basis that a number of top-tier 
contractors from the selected home locations are present in the Australian sector 
concerned and some of these contractors are not amongst the top few leading 
contractors in their home country. This may suggest that other contractors from these 
home countries are at least capable of winning and delivering projects in the selected 
sector in Australia. In this sense, the knowledge and skills required for the 
management of the construction of a major road and bridge projects may be 
reasonably widely and globally dispersed (suggesting lesser opportunities for 
competitive advantages arising from O advantages). At the same time, Table 3 
(concerning L advantages) indicates that contractors from US and China may face 
much greater country specific risks/take a much dimmer view of these set-up 
costs/risks - at least in comparison to contractors from Japan or Spain. And, indeed, 
there is/has been in last few years a much greater presence of contractors from Japan 
and Spain, than from China and US, in Australia in the sector concerned. The much 
larger size/potential size of both the markets in China and US, along with the higher 
number of Chinese and US contractors in the sample frame developed for this 
research is also consistent with both of the above points. 
Once again, these are very tentative conclusions at this stage and robust conclusions 
are only likely to be forthcoming having completed primary data collection from the 
planned case studies and survey. The case studies and survey will also seek to 
comprehensively test the propositions in this paper and further investigate the relative 
importance of O advantages versus L advantages in explaining the current extent of 
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FDI/expressions of interest from contractors in the four home countries. Such that, 
harnessing the relative strengths of the completed analysis of secondary data; cases 
studies and survey and triangulating the outcomes these methods, will provide strong 
evidence upon which to conclude the relative of importance of O advantages versus L 
advantages in the context of this research and which is progress that Seymour (1987) 
indicated would be very valuable and difficult to achieve. And in total, this answers 
Seymour’s call to seek to significantly advance the OLI framework and increase our 
understanding of the FDI decision. That is, this research will not only increase the 
explanatory power of Dunning's framework by revealing the relative importance of 
the O and L factors, it will also extend the scope of Dunning’s framework to the issue 
of in-bound FDI to Australia and in the context of multinational contracting. Finally, 
the research will also contribute to method. To the authors’ knowledge, this will be the 
first operationalisation, in this context, of the Resource-Based Theory in terms of O 
advantages in the planned case studies and TCE on the issue of risk as part of the L 
factor in the review of secondary data presented in this paper. Furthermore, the 
research will yield some very important practical contributions including a global map 
of the relative attractiveness of the Australian market and, within this map, indications 
of the relative competiveness and productivity of indigenous contractors. Finally, the 
research will identify aspects of the location factor that can be influenced by 
government, as well as surfacing any misconceptions of the Australian market.  
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